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NOTE AND COMMENT
THE LAw ScHooL.-The year i919-i92o opens with 336 sudents enrolled.
These are classified as follows: Third year--85; second year--W; first year
-149; special-s. As compared with 65 enrolled a year ago the present attendance is gratifying. Preliminary applscations point to a large number of
entering students in February.
We regret to announce the resignations of Professor Stoner who has
accepted a position with the Detroit Pressed Steel Company of Detroit,
Michigan; and of Professor Barbour who has accepted a call to the faculty
of the Yale Law School; Professor Edwin D. Dickinson, A.B. Carleton, A.M.
Dartmouth, Ph.D. Harvard, J.D. Michigan, has been added to the faculty.
Professor Dickinson, who was an editor of this Review, has made an enviable
reputation for himself in the field of International Law, a course which he
will give in the Law School.
Courses foi the year are assigned as follows: Dean Bates-Constitutional
Law and Torts; Professor Lane-Evidence, Conflict of Laws, and Insurance;
Professor Wilgus- Torts and Corporations; Professor Goddard- Agency,
Bailments and Carriers, Public Service Companies, Wills, and Property IV;
Professor Sunderland-Trial Practice, Common Law Pleading, Code Pleading, and Practice Court; Professor Holborok-Mining Law, Irrigation Law,
Municipal Corporations, Domestic Relations, and Administration Law; Professor Drake-Property I, Damages, Partnership, Roman Law, and Jurisprudence; Professor Aigler-Property II, Property III, and Bankruptcy; Pro-
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fessor Durfee-Equity, Mortgages, Suretyship and Quasi Contracts; Professor Waite-Criminal Law, Sales, Bills and Notes, and Patent Law; Professor
Dickinson-Trusts and Public International Law; Professor Grismore--Contracts.
During the year Mr. James A. Veasey, General Counsel of The Carter Oil
Company, will deliver a special series of lectures on Oil and Gas Law. These
lectures will appear in the Review.

Tnt SCINTILLA Rua or EvrNrxce.-In analyzing the reasons why "trial
by jury has declined to such an extent that it has come in many cases to be
an avowed maxim of professional action,--a good case is for the court; a
bad case is for the jury,"-JuDx DxioN, in his LAwS AND JURISPRUDZNCP,
pp. 130-2, credits "the false principle known as the scintilla doctrine" with a
large degree of responsibility.
The scintilla rule is essentially a medieval product. Scholasticism centered
in logic, and the schoolmen contemplated everything in the glass of Aristotelian formulae. The syllogism was the great weapon of logical conquest,
and the syllogism was deductive. It required a universal for its starting
point. It exactly reversed the modern notion of looking to experience for
data on which to build up general rule%. It started with the general rule,
which it derived abstractly. Once derived, it became, like the bed of Procrustes, the standard which experience must be forcibly made to fit. The
doctor of laws in determining what cases should go to the jury, and the
doctor of theology in deciding what souls should be saved, would apply
an identical principle--conformity to a preconception. The fact that in
either case the result might be unreasonable was of no consequence. It
was heresy to deny the premise and folly to deny the conclusion.
The preconception on which the scintilla rule rests is that all questions of
fact must go to the iury. And the reason for this is that it is a maxim of
the common law that "ad quaestionem facti non respondent judices." The
scholastic mind is satisfied with this reason. It is based on authority; it keeps
practice subordinate to theory and thus maintains the medieval conception
of the ascendency of the universal over the individual; it offers the infallible
test of logic instead of the uncertain test of experience.
The essence of the scintilla rule is the total elmination of the question of
the weight of the evidence from the consideration of the court. All relevant
evidence should look alike, for the court, endowed only with a vision for the
universal, can see in all evidence only a question of relevancy. It stands
indifferent between the most convincing evidence on one side and the weight
of a hair on the other. The court, being the instrumentality of logic, not
common sense, is not expected or allowed to apply any rule but the rule of
logic. Hence nothing is judicially absurd unless it is illogical, no matter how
absurd it may be in its practical results.
The scintilla rule is seldom followed by modern courts. THompsoN says
it is "hardly mentioned by any court but to be repudiated." TRIALS, Sec.
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2246, note. Here and there a court has adhered to it literally. Holtzclaw v.
Moore (Tex. Ct. of Civ. App.) 192 S. W. 582; Chicago and Erie RR. Co. v.
Hamerick, 5o Ind. App. 425. Kentucky adheres to it but admits its absurdity.
Farmers' Batik v. Birk, 179 Ky. 761. In South Carolina the rule is followed
in name but repudiated in substance by defining a "scintilla" to mean such
evidence as is sufficient to warrant a reasonable jury in rendering a verdict
upon it. Dutton v. Ati. Coast Line RR. Co., 104 S. C. i6.
Most courts lay down some rule as to the weight of evidence which will
justify sending a case to the jury, and while the wording of the rules varies
widely, in substance they all amount to this, that the evidence must have
sufficient weight to make a verdict in accordance with it reasonable. Most
commonly it is said that the case is for the jury if reasonable minds could
differ in regard to it. Virgilio v. Walker, 254 Pa. 241; Carolina,C. & 0. Ry.
Co. v. Stroup, 230 Fed. 75; Aiken v. Atl. Life Ins. Co. (N. C. 1917) 92 S. E.
184; Bank of Cortland v. Maxey, ioz Neb. 2o; Conway v. Monidah Trust,
51 Mont. 13; Sartain v. Walker (Okl. i9x6) i59 Pac. io96; Brown v. Thomas,
i2o Va. 763. Some cases say the test is whether the jury could find the fact
sought to be proved without acting unreasonably in the eye of the law. Wilcox v. Internat. Hare. Co., 278 Ill. 465; Stewart v. Ill. Cent. RR. Co., 201 Ill.
App. 187. Some require the evidence to be such that the jury might lawfully
find in accordance with it. Thiesen v. Gulf, F. & A. Ry. Co. (Fla., 1918), 78
So. 491. Some say the evidence must-be sufficient to sustain the case. Cromwell v. Chance Marine Const. Co., 131 Md. xos. Some courts send the case
to the jury if there is any substantial evidence. Treble v. Am. Steel Fousndries (Mo. 1916) 185 S. W. 179. Other courts say the evidence must be such
as to zoarrant the jury in finding a verdict, Zeigrist v. Speer, 29 Del. 43Y; McAlinden v. St. Maries Hospital Assn., 28 Ida. 657; or must authorize the jury
to so find, Moore v. Dixie ins. Co., ig Ga. App. 8oo. In New York a verdict
may be directed when the evidence is such that a contrary verdict must,.not
merely may, be set aside. Getty v. W4illiams Silver Co., 221 N. Y. 34. In the
so
federal courts and in some states the rule is that if the evidence is of
verdict
a
aside
set
to
bound
feel
would
court
the
that
conclusive a character
in opposition to, it, then a verdict should be directed. CanadianNorthern Ry.
Co v. Senske, 2o Fed. 637; Kalish v. White, 36 Cal. App. .6o4; Meyer v.
Houck, 85 Iowa, 319; Baxter v. Brandenburg, 137 Minn. 259.
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Such being the principle underlying the scintilla rule and the state of
supreme
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find
to
surprising
and
interesting
rather
is
it
law regarding it,
court of Ohio, in an opinion published in September of the present year,
standing pat on the scintilla rule in its crudest form. In Clark v. McFarland
(Ohio, 1918) I24 N. F. 164, it appeared that a will had been admitted to
probate by the order of the proper court. This order was by statute declared
to be prima facie evidence of the due execution and validity of the will. A
contes~t was then brought, and since the contestant failed to present any substantial evidence of invalidity, the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant. On appeal the judgment was reversed on the ground that a mere
scintilla of evidence was enough to send the case to the jury even in the
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face of an order of probate declared by statute to be prima facie proof of
validity. Not only was the case on its merits a very extreme, one in which
to apply the rule, but two prior decisions of the Court of Appeals of Ohio
were thereby overruled. A dissenting opinion by JoNas, J., in which no other
judge concurred, argued that the statute referred to made the scintilla rule
inapplicable to will contests, but did not question the propriety of the rule
as a general principle of law. Evidently the Ohio Supreme Court feels irrevocably committed to this all but obsolete doctrine, and a statute will probably be necessary to get rid of it.
E. R. S.

JuvENILE Couars AND PRILaGED COMMUNICATIONS. - In the case of
I8i Pac. 531, the Supreme Court of Colorado
Lindsey v. People, (Colo., ig)
has held that Judge Lindsey of the Juvenile Court of Denver could not refuse
to testify as to a communication made to him by a child who was at the time
of the communication suspected of crime and against whom proceedings were
later taken in the Juvenile Court. The decision was by a vote of four to three,
and a vigorous dissenting opinion was written by Justice Bailey and concurred
in by Justices Scott and Allen.
The case arose under the following circumstances: a man had been killed
and his wife was suspected of murdering him; their twelve-year-old son was
also under suspicion. The boy went to judge Lindsey's chambers in the
Juvenile Court to consult the Judge about the case and, after being assured
by the Judge that any statement made to the latter would be confidential and
that no disclosure of the same could be forced from the Judge, the boy made
a statement as to the circumstances of the killing of his father. The wife
of the deceased was later tried for the murder of her husband, and thr.boy
testified in her behalf. The prosecution then sought to show that the boy had
made a statement tq Judge Lindsey which was inconsistent with his testimony at the trial, and called upon the latter to testify-as to the statement
made to him by the bo)' under the circumstances above detailed. judge Lindsey declined to disclose the information he had thus received, on the ground
,that the communication w-is privileged; he persisted in his refusal after the
trial court had ordered him to answer, and was found guilty of contempt of
court and fined. The Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the court below.
It is admitted in both the prevailing and dissenting opinions that the case
is one of first inpression; the dissenting opinion justifies the claim of privilege
by pointing out analogies to other and similar situations in which the claim
is clearly recognized; the majority opinion denies the privilege because no
clear and unmistakable basis for it is contained in the various sections of the
Colorado Statutes cited in the brief of the plaintiff in error. It is interesting
that both' opinions, in discussing the general question of privilege, rely on
Wigmore on Evidence, § 2285, where the learned author states the ruile as
follows: "(i) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed; (2) this element of confidentiality must be essential to
the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties; (3)
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the relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered; (4) the injury that would inure to the relation by the
disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby
that
gained for the correct disposal of litigation.' It seems perfectly clear
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in evidence. But the majority opinionin the instant case does not even admit
that the privilege ought to extend to such communications; it contends rather
that the privilege should not exist, because it might tend to prevent the disclosure of facts which, the court felt, should have been disclosed in this particular instance. In this it ignores the considerations of public policy which
have led to the almost universal recognition of all' the phases of privileged
communication, and also ignores the weighty reasons based on the peculiar
requirement of confidence in the successful working out of the juvenile
Court Law. It is to be hoped that the Colorado legislature will soon repair
the damage done by this decision.
E. H.

LIQUIDAT.ON or DAMAGES BY PE-EsTIMAT.-A freshly minted phrase, if
attractive in form, even though it connotes no new idea, will frequently have
as extensive a circulation, even in our supreme courts, as wquld a real concept. In a contract for building two laboratories for the Department of Agriculture, the contractor had agreed that the United States should be entitled
to the "fixed sum of $2oo, as liquidated damages * * * for each and every
day's delay" in the completion of the buildings. The court decided that this
was a stipulation for liquidated damage because it was the result of a "genuine
pre-estimate" of the anticipated loss. Wise v. 'United States (May, 1gg),
Adv. 0. 343.
The use of this term, "pre-estimate", as a new canon of interpretation for
distinguishing liquidated damages from penalty, seems to belong to the last
two decades, but during that time it has had a flourishing existence and a continual misapplication. In the case of the Sun Pub. Assoc. v. Moore (19o),
183 U. S. 6 4', a yacht was rented to be used for gathering news, the parties
agreeing that "for the purpose of this charter the value of the yacht shall be
considered and taken at seventy-five thousand -dollars." The court "refused
to consider evidence tending to show. that the admitted value was excessive".
In the case of the United States v. Bethichem Steel Co. (xgo6), 2o5 U. S. IO5,
in a contract for the delivery of disappearing gun-carriages, it was agreed that
"the amount of the penalty for delay in delivery" was to be $35 per day.
It was decided that this was liquidated damages and not a penalty, but the
court said that "the principle decided in that case (Sun Pub. Co. v. Moore)
is much like the contention of the government herein". These two cases and
an intermediate English case, Clydebank E. and S. Co. v. Castaneda, [igo5]
A. C. 6, have since been quoted as though they were precedents, for decisions
in our Federal and State courts and in England: and the English court uses
the phrase "a genuine pre-estimate", which has since been repeated so often,
and is given as the reason for the decision in our instant case. This phrase
has been used so often by the courts that it seemed best to the revising editors of the last editions of Sedgwick's treatises on the subject of Damages
to add, after a presentation of various canons of interpretation, a section on
"VALUATION AND Paz-AscTAixmzNT."
Cf. SZDGWICKC, ELEMENTS or THE
LAW or DAMAGES, page z24, and SzExwicic-BEALE, MEASURE oF DAMAGES,
Section 42o, a.
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It was pointed out somd years ago, cf. 9 MicH. LAW REV. 588, (i91i), that
these cases in the United States Supreme Court and in the Court of Appeals
do not add anything to the principle of the law of damages nor do they add
to our canons of interpretation of contracts as for liquidated damages or. a
penalty. The Sun Case is a simple case of estoppel on the contract of the
parties, and the only question to be determined is whether or not the party
is estopped. There is in the Sun Case an almost unique state of facts. The
only case like it that has been observed by the writer is Elphinsone v. Monkland Iron and Coal Co. (1886), ii A. C. 332, and the estoppel is perfectly
evident in e:ther case. In a series of cases somewhat similar in character,
arising under the HEPBURN AcT, it is argued most forcefully by Justice PiTNEY,
in a dissenting opinion, that one of the essential elements'of estoppel is wanting and therefore the estoppel fails. Cf. Boston and Maine Rd. v. Hooker,
233 U. S. 134, also 15 COL. LAW RviEw, 413.

On the other hand. the Bethlehem Case, the Clydebank Case, and others on
the stme state of facts, are to be interpreted under the long established canon
of interpretation, that where the damages are very diflojIlt of ascertainment
they are to be considered liquidated. Cf. SEDGWIcK-BEALE, MEASURE OF DAM72.
AGES, Section 416; SvmGwIcK, ELEmENTS OF THE LAW OF DAMAGE,
In the use-made of these cases it should be said that the courts have usually gone right, wjithout however seeing why they have done so. The principle upon which' thc Sun Case was decided is not at all similar to the contention of the Government in the Bcthleh]ens Case, because the facts of the
two cases are widely different, and the citation of the two cases are precedent for cases in which the facts are on all fours with those in one case but
not in the other, can lead only to hopeless bewilderment. It would seem wise
J. H. D.
for the courts to recognize this situation.
iHE REFERENDUM AS APPLIED TO PRoOSED AMENDMENTS OF THE FEDERAL

CONSTITUTIO'.-That various aspects of the fight against the National Prohi-

bition (the i8th) Amendment would result in litigation was to be expected.
The attack at present seem&to be based on the use of the provisions for referendum found in a dozen or more' of the states the votes of which went to
make up the necessary three-fourths. Three very recent decisions or expressions of opinion by state courts of last resort are in this respect extremely
interesting.
In Herbring v. Brown, i8o Pac. 328, decided April'9, igig, the Supreme
Couet of Oregon in a mandamus proceeding refused tZ order the Attorney
General of that state to perform certain necessary functions prerequisite to
the submission of the ratification of the 18th Amendment by the legislature
to a vote of the people under the Referendum provision of the state constitution. On thc other hand in State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, 181 Pac. 920
(May 24, 1919), the Supreme Court of Washington in a similar proceeding
ordered the Secretary of State to take the necessary steps for such submission. Finally, in Re Opinion of the Justices, io7 Ati. 673, (September, pig9)
the Maine Supreme Court advised the Governor of that state that the ratifi-
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cation of the x8th Amendment by the legislaure of Maine could not be
referred to a vote of the people. Newspapers indicate other cases as pending.
In these three cases there are considered the two questions bound to rise
in this connection. tPoes the language of Article, V of the national constitution make the matter of ratification or rejection of proposed amendments a
function of the Legislature, in the usual sense of that word? This, of course,
is a federal question and until passed on by the United States Supreme Court
must be considered as open. The second question is: Does the state provision
for referendum cover the reference of acts of the legislature such as are consummated in ratifying a proposed amendment? This obviously is a local question, and the Supreme Court will not examine into the soundness of the conclusion of the state court. Davis v. Ohio, 241 U. S. 565.
An answer to the first question depends upon the proper construction to be
given to Article V of the federal Constitution. This article which prescribes
the method of amending the Constitution provides as follows: "The Congress whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall pro-'
pose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a convention proposiig
amendments, which, in either case shall be valid to all intents and purposes,
as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths
of the several States or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one
or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress ;" etc. In
the Washington case above referred to, the court concluded that legislature
as used in this Article V, does not mean necessarily the legislative assembly,
that it is legislative power rather than legislative body that is meant. In arriving at this conclusion the court 'relies very largely upon what seems to be
a wholly mistaken construction of the decision by the United States Supreme
Court in Davis v. Ohio, 241 U. S. 565.
It is important to determine just what the supreme court deciced in that
case. The Ohio legislature had passed an act redistricting'the state for congressional representation. On proper petition under the Ohio referendum
provision this act of the legislature was voted upon by the people and rejected.
The Ohio Supreme Court in State ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 94 Ohio St.
x54, decided that the unfavorable vote had nullified the action of the legislature. The United States Supreme Court affirmed this decision. The contention of the losing side was based, in part at least, upon the wording of § IV,
of Article x of the federal constitution which provides that "the times,
places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall
be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may
at any time by law make or alter such regulations except as to the places of
choosing senators." It was argued that the word legislature made the action
of the state legislature in the redistricting Act final. This contention was rejected 'bat the Washington court at least seems to have failed to appreciate
that the basis of this rejection was the part of § IV, Article I, following the
semicolon. At the time of the adoption of the constitution it was a common
practice among the states to elect the representatives to the national legislative body at large. 'This practice continued in a number of states down to
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1842. In that year, Congress provided, acting under the part of § IV of Article I, following the semicolon, for the election of congressmen by districts.
I WATSON ON THS CONSTITUTION, 274. Under the Act of Feb. 7, i89i, Chap.
116, 26 Stat. 735, it was commanded that the existing districts in a state
should continue in force "until the legislature of such state in the manner
herein prescribed shall redistrict such state." By § IV of Chap. 5 of Act of
Congress of Aug. 8, igs1 (37 Stat. 13), this was amended so as to provide
that the redistricting should be made by a state "in the manner provided by
the laws thereof." Mr. Chief Justice White in the Davis case said, "and
the legislative history of this act leaves no room for doubt that. prior words
were stricken out and the new words inserted for the express purpose, in
so far as Congress had power to do it, of excluding the possibility of making
the contention as to referendum which is now urged." See Cong. Rec., Vol.
de47, PP. 3436, 3437, 35o7. The only thing that the Supreme Court really
cided in the Davis case seems to have been that there is nothing so far as the
judiciary are concerned, about the initiative and referendum that destroys
the republican form of government of the state which adopts such machinery
in its lawmaking. Pacific Telephone Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. iis. The
course, then, which the proposed redistricting in Ohio took seems to have
been squarely in accord with the then provisions of Congress which in turn
were expressly authorized by the latter half of § IV of Article I of the Constitution.
The argument that the word legislature.as used in Article V of the Constituion means the legislative body derives some support from the view
which seems to have prevailed very generally prior to the 17th amendment
that United States senators could not constitutionally be elected by the direct
vote of the people, the constitution providing expressly that senators should
be elected by the "legislatures" of the several states. There can be no do.ibt
that the .word "legislature" had a perfectly well defined meaning to the framers of the constitution, and it would seem entirely clear that it was used in its
then common sense. Terms of variable meaning according to circumstances
as "commerce" and 'due process of law" have been declared frequently not
to have been used in a rigid sense; on the other hand a term such as "jury"
is held to have been used in a fixed, non-elastic sense. The word "legislature"
would seem more properly to fall within the latter class. See Winslow, C. J.,
in Borgnis v. Folk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 348 et &eq. See however, Re Opinion
of the Justices, 107 At. 7o5 (ig9g), where the Maine court said that despite
the word "legislature" in Art. 2, § i, subd. 2, the state referendum could be
invoked as to a state act affecting the manner of choosing electors.
In the Maine case, the court took the view that in voting upon proposed
amendments to the federal constitution, a state legislature is not acting in
any legislative capacity but that its action is directly pursuant to the expression of the will of the people as stated in Article V. It is pointed out that the
people might conceivably have provided for a state vote to be cast by either
house of the legislative body alone, or by the governor, or in any other way
that might have been designated. This view finds support in Dodge v. Woolillngham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336; 2 WATSON ON THE CONsey, x8 How. 33I
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SnuTION, 13io. See also
tices, 107 At. 705, supra.

4 Elliott. Deb. 176, '77.

Cf. Re Opinion of the Jus-

The Oregon constitution providing for referring to a vote of the people
"any act of the Legislative Assembly" is fairly typical of state referendum
provisions. In Michigan it is declared that "Any bill passed by the legislature approved by the governor, except appropriation bills, may be referred,"
etc. The Nevada constitution provides for reference of any'law or resolution.
It is common knowledge that ratification of proposed amendments is by joint
resolution, not by act oi bill. In the Oregon case the court concluded that
this was sufficient to make the referendum provision inapplicable. On the
other hand, the Washington 'court dealing with a referendum provision essentially the same, held the referendum properly made use of.
That a joint resolution is not an act or a bill in the normal sense of the
words must have been known to the makers of the various constitutions.
See WT.LAW, .LFGISLATivE HANDOOTC; Chap. 5. However, such situations
would not seem appropriate for strict, technical constructions, and if law is
made by a joint resolution it would seem a not unreasonable contention that
the referendum provision should apply. Such was the view of the Supreme

Court of, California in Hopping v. City of Richmbnd, i7o Cal. 605. Where
a joint -esolution is used, as it often is, as an administrative measure of course
there should be no reference unless such acts of the legislative body are clearly included. Even under the liberal view of the California case it would
seem that the referendum would be inapplicable to votes on these proposed
amendments, the action of the legislature not being properly legislative. See
Ellingham v. Dye, .supra.
Indeed it might reasonably be doubted as to whether the question of
effective ratification of'proposed amendments, the counting of the votes by the
states, is really a judicial question. The section quaranteeing a republican
form of government is a familiar instance of a constitutional provision held
not to zaise a problem for the courts. Pacific Telephone Co. v. Oregon Supra.
R. W. A.
PRgSUMPTIONS-BTSDzN OF Paoor.-The case of Gillett v. Michigan United

Traction Co. (Michigan, April 3rd, 1919), x71 N. W.'536, arose out of the
following facts: Plaintiff, driving a Ford car with the curtains down, turned
from the curb at the side 6f the street where he had stopped, to cross the
interurban car tracks which ran through the. center of the street in the city
of Marshall, and as he drove his machine upon the track was struck by an
interurban car and seriously injured. The evidence established beyond question, negligence of the defendant, by showing that the car was, at the tithe,
exceeding the lawful rate of speed. The only question of fact .in dispute
was whether plaintiff was negligent in such manner as to have contributed
to his injury. The case was taken from the jiry upon the ground that the
plaintiff had, failed to discharge his burden of proving himself free. from
such negligence. In view of the case as presented to the supreme court its
Affirmation was required. There are one or two paragraphs of the affirming
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opinion, however, which though in a sense obiter, may be considered worthy
of note.
The theory upon which the case was taken from the jury was, that it was
the duty of the plaintiff before driving upon the track, to have looked and
listened for an approaching car. That had he done so he would have seen
or heard the car which struck him, and to attempt to cross with that knowledge would be negligence, and if he failed so to look and listen he was negligent as matter of law. and in either case his action must fail.
The court's discussion is concerned mainly with the presumption of due
care. One interesting phase of the opinion deals with the effect of the presumption of law upon the .course of the trial. We recognize that there are
two classes of such presumptions; the conclusive, permitting no attempt to
show the non-existence of the fact presumed, and that which is disputable,
requiring the finding of the fact presumed, in the absence of evidence tending
to show that it does not exist, but permitting the introduction of such evidence to show that in the particular case, in spite of the presumption, it does
not exist. That phase of the court's opinion here particularly referred to, is
that which assumes, for the purposes of the court'skdiscussion, that a rebuttable presumption of due care on the part of the plaintiff does obtain in certain
cases until evidence tending to show its absence is given. In one paragraph
the court says: "If uninfluenced by the presumption the jury reaches the
conclusion that the evidence tending to show plaintiff's negligence, is not entitled to credit and should be disregarded, the presumption may then be considered as remaining in force so far as may be necessary to establish the fact
that the deceased, (plaintiff), exercised proper care- in all respects not expressly established by the. evidence." In other words, though the evidence
does "expressby establish" that plaintiff did not in certain respects exercise
proper care, yet the presumption of due care is still operating in the case
as to other phases of the question of due care, than such as are so "expressly
established" by the evidence.
This question would, on first impression, seem to be purely academic,,
since if there is want of due care in the plaintiff in any respect which contributes to his injury, he must fail in his action, regardless of the degree of
care he may have exercised in all other respects. The us6 made of it in the
discussion of the court is to point out that if the evidence which goes to the
jury tending to show want of due care in some definite particular, should
still leave the jury ready to find due care in that specific feature of the transaction, that in such event the presumption would still operate requiring the
conclusion of due care in all other respects than that to which the evidence
introduced was relevant.
To illustrate: if a witness were to testify that the plaintiff did not "look,"
but no witness was able to testify that he "listened," that the court would be
justified in instructing the jury that if, after conslaering all the evidence
bearing upon whether he did look, they should be satisfied that the preponderance of the evidence was in favor of the contention that he did, then the
presumption that he "listened" would still operate and require the finding
that he did listen. This view necessitates the conclusion that the introduc-
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tion of evidence in opposition to the presumption of due care of such probative value as must carry it to the jury, does not necessarily eliminate the
general presumption of due care in accordance with the rule as we find it
generally expressed, but only has the effect of eliminating the presumption
in so far as that phase of due care is concerned to which the evidence is
directly relevant.
Presumptions of law exist for the convenience of making proofs and so
expediting trials, and are founded in the common experience of men with
certain specific facts or" conditions. Such experience has shown that certain
facts and conditions are so related as that they are generally found to be
co-existent. Rules of law applicable to such cases have come into existence
requiring that where certain of the facts or conditions so related are found
to exist, the other or others of such facts or conditions shall be found to
exist--either with or without the opportunity, in the party against whom the
rule operates, to show that such other facts or conditions do not exist in the
particular case, dependent 'upon the uniformity of experience with such relations of facts or conditions.
Where the presumption of due care obtains it is grounded in the theory,
that in the presence of known danger men usually are careful to avoid it,
but that since, nevertheless many do not, the presumption is not conclusive
but rebuttable. In this case the plaintiff knew of the railway track and that
to cross it involved a serious measure of danger. These facts being proved,
a recognition of the presumption in this case requires the conclusion that
plaintiff exercised due care. but permits evidence in opposition to that conclusion.
The general rule that the presumption disappears with the introduction of
evidence in opposition to the conclusion it requires, if sufficient to go to the
jury, is recognized by the court in its opinion and needs no citation of authority to support it. The case is novel however, so far as the writer has been
able to discover, in holding that evidence of sufficient probative value to carry
to the jury the question of whether the plaintiff was negligent in some particular, does not open the whole question of due care to be determined upon
the evidence presented, the presumption disappearing entirely.
Is not the presumption one, not that he "looked" and that he "listened"
or that he did any other particular thing essential to due care, but that he did
all things essential to that due care? If this be true should it not be concluded that one having the burden of proving due care, against whom there
is introduced evidenze tending to show him negligent in a material element
of his conduct should be required to establish due care by his evidence unassisted by the presumption? Any evidence, worthy of consideration by the
jury, in opposition to the conclusion requ4 red by the presumption, if introduced by the plaintiff, would defeat the presumption of due care under the
general rule. The presumption, by giving a probative value to facts which
they wotild not have except for the rule, is an exceptional method of proof
and ought not to be extended to allow proof by it .of any other than the fact
to be presumed, that of due care, and when the conclusion of due care is
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impeached by evidence of such substance as to present a real question for
the jury, the presumption disappears.
Again in this case the court makes an unfortunate use of the term "burden of proof". As already indicated, the plaintiff insisted that because there
was no witness who was able to testify that he did not "look" and "listen",
that it was to be presumed that he did both, even though there may have
been evidence that he was negligent in other respects, sufficient to take the
question of due care to the jury. The court in discussing this claim of plaintiff says: "There is no reason why an unsuccessful attempt to show the negligence of plaintiff- in some particular respect, should place upon him the
burden of proving by affirmative evidence that he used due care in all respects
-a burden which did not rest upon him before the attempt was made."
The criticism of this statement is, that that particular burden, that of
proving "that he used due care in all respects"i is just the burden which
plaintiff, under the rule in Michigan, does take upon himself when he brings
his action and it does not leave him till the trial is ended. He must lift this
burden or he fails in the action. Detroit & M. R. Co. v. Van Stcinburg, 17
Mich. 99; Guggenheim v. L. S. & M. S. R. Co., 66 Mich. 15o. The case was
tried upon that theory and the opinion in all other portions proceeds upon
V.H.L.
that theory.

